风险投资参与对中资企业首次公开发行折价的影响——不同证券市场的比较

本文考察中资企业在不同市场上市时风险投资的参与是否影响首次公开发行折价。研究发现,在大陆中小板和香港主板市场上市的中资企业中,有风险投资参与的企业IPO折价显著高于无风险投资参与的企业,支持声誉效应假说,即风险投资机构以IPO折价来提早退出投资项目,以此来建立自己的声誉,吸引更多的资金流入。在美国市场风险投资的参与对IPO折价则没有显著影响。本文进一步研究发现从业时间短的风险投资机构,其参与投资的公司上市时的历史也较短;风险投资进入企业的时间越长,IPO折价水平也越高。这两个检验都验证了风险投资机构通过IPO折价提早退出投资项目,进一步支持了声誉效应假说。     

创业投资家与企业家的人力资本特性研究

创业投资企业作为一种知识型企业,与传统企业的最大不同在于,人力资本在资源配置中开始上升为主导地位。首先。创业投资家为创业投资企业配置知识资本与人力资本,这一点可以从理论与实证两方面进行解释。其次,创业不仅是创业企业家一种对机会的识别与新价值发现,而且是创业团队人员共同参与的创新行动,这个行动体现出了创业企业家特有的创业精神。第三,创业投资家与创业企业家之间的人力资本特性关系以及由此产生的治理机制是创业投资企业治理的关键,信任与合作是克服创业投资家和创业企业家之间代理风险的关键。本文主要从以上三方面详细分析了创业投资家与创业企业家的人力资本特性及其相互关系。     

The venture capital entry model on game options with jump-diffusion process

This paper aims to apply game options to construct the optimal decision-making and management tool for venture capital (VC) firms. This model emphasizes the inferences with game options on the market structures formed by different competition and investment strategies of the two VC firms to reflect the investment returns. These market structures are classified into an entry-deterred game (specific monopoly), a leader's dominated strategies (duopoly), and simultaneous investment. It is considered how to select investment timing to avoid any potential competitive threats in order to provide the optimal expected threshold values for the investment decisions of VC firms.     

创业板市场的IPO研究

本较为全面地研究了创业板的IPO市场。风险企业IPO是风险资本退出的有效渠道,风险型企业中的“内部投资”－风险投资家,将在企业IPO煌时间决策,定价和股权结构等方面发挥特别作用;同时邓创业板市场的定价,承销机制提出了一些建议。     

Corporate Philanthropy, Criminal Activity, and Firm Reputation: Is There a Link?

This study examined the influence of corporate giving programs on the link between certain categories of corporate crime and corporate reputation. Specifically, firms that violate EPA and OSHA regulations should, to some extent, experience a decline in their reputations, while firms that contribute to charitable causes should see their reputations enhanced. The results of this study support both of these contentions. Further, the results suggest that corporate giving significantly moderates the link between the number of EPA and OSHA violations committed by a firm and its reputation. Thus, while a firm's reputation can be diminished through its violation of various government regulations, the extent of the decline in reputation may be significantly reduced through charitable giving.     

私人股权投资在中国的现状、问题和选择

我国私人股权投资所面临的主要问题是私人股权市场主体缺位严重,尚未建立有效的运作机制,投资管理的理念,工具和手段落后,以及退出渠道不畅。本文提出加强政策引导,促进社会资本进入、建立有限合伙制度、强化金融创新和积极培育多层次资本市场等政策建议。     

浅析深圳中小企业板的发展问题

在深圳中小企业板正式设立之后,如何使其能平稳过渡到最后的创业板成为各界关注的焦点。本文通过分析海外创业板市场,总结出了一些对深圳中小企业板发展有价值的观点。     

推进我国风险投资发展的对策

风险投资作为一种新兴融资方式,在我国已有了一定程度的发展,但也存在不容忽视的问题,必须采取有效措施,推进我国风险投资的发展。     

What you are is what you like—similarity biases in venture capitalists' evaluations of start-up teams

This paper extends recent research studying biases in venture capitalist's decision making. We contribute to this literature by analyzing biases arising from similarities between a venture capitalist and members of a venture team. We summarize the psychological foundations of such similarity effects and derive a set of hypotheses regarding the impact of similarity on the assessment of team quality. Using data from a conjoint experiment with 51 respondents, we find that venture capitalists tend to favor teams that are similar to themselves in type of training and professional experience. Our results have important implications for academics and practitioners alike.     

The relationship between governance structure and risk management approaches in Japanese venture capital firms

This paper attempts to understand what drives Japanese venture capital (JVC) fund managers to select either active managerial monitoring or portfolio diversification to manage their firms' investment risks [J. Bus. Venturing 4 (1989) 231]. Unlike U.S. venture capitalists that use active managerial monitoring to gain private information in order to maximize returns [J. Finance 50 (1995) 301], JVCs have traditionally used portfolio diversification to attenuate investment risks [Hamada, Y., 2001. Nihon no Bencha Kyapitaru no Genkyo (Current State of Japanese Venture Capital), Nihon Bencha Gakkai VC Seminar, May 7]. We found that performance pay is positively related to active monitoring and that management ownership is positively related to active monitoring and negatively related to portfolio diversification. The managerial implication of our study is that venture capitalists should be as concerned about the structure of their incentive systems for their fund managers as they are for their investee-firm entrepreneurs. Agency theory says that contingent compensation is a self-governing mechanism for individual effort that is difficult to measure and verify. When properly applied, equity ownership and performance-based pay can have powerful influencing effects on the strategic choices of managers.